A DUTY TO RESCUE WITHIN THE SEXUAL ABUSE

CoNTExT: FORESEFABILITY AND PuBuc PoLIcY DRIVE
THE DUTY ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEw

JERSEY
2
The tort of negligence' has four components - duty, breach,3
causation, 4 and damages. 5 While these four components are treated

See BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990) (defining negligence as
"[t]he omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordinary
considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do"); see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)
(enumerating the elements of the tort of negligence).
See KEETON ET AL., supranote 1, § 30, at 164. Professor Keeton describes duty
as an "obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks."
Id. Keeton further notes, "The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question - whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendant's conduct." Id. § 53, at 357; see also id. at 357-58 (discussing the
concept of duty and, briefly, the problems that exist within duty analysis). Finally,
Keeton states that "[ijt is therefore not surprising to find that the problem of duty is
as broad as the whole law of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has
been formulated." Id.
See id. § 30, at 164. Keeton defines breach as "[a] failure on the person's part
to conform to the standard required." Id.; see also id. § 37, at 236-37 (stating that the
concept of breach is uniquely tied to the general concept of a standard of care and
that the relevant question is what the reasonable person would do under the same or
similar set of circumstances). Keeton explains that
[u] nder our system of procedure, [the question of breach] is to be determined in all doubtful cases by the jury, because the public insists
that its conduct be judged in part by the man in the street rather than
by lawyers, and the jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the impact of the law.
Id. § 30, at 237.
4 See id. § 30, at 165 (explaining that the element of causation
demands "[a] rea-

sonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury"). A
"cause in fact" or "but-for cause" is some conduct by the defendant that can be connected to the harm experienced by a plaintiff in a scientifically logical, physical
manner. See id. § 41, at 266. Moreover, a proximate cause is conduct by the defendant close enough in the causal chain of events to Aforeseeable harm suffered by a
plaintiff so as to warrant the defendant's legal liability for that harm. See id. In order
to make out his case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was both a cause in fact and a proximate cause of his harm. See id. (illustrating
that there are two types of causation that must be proven).
See id. § 30, at 165 (describing the damages requirement as the plaintiff's obli-
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as separate and distinct elements,6 the duty requirement often proves
to be the most consequential, as well as the most fiercely litigated
The primary reason that the duty requirement is so important is that
a court's finding of a duty will often determine the outcome of a negligence action.8 Thus, determining the duty issue has remained the
province ofjudges rather than juries. 9
gation to prove that the defendant's conduct caused him some measurable harm
such that the plaintiff deserves compensation).
6 See id. § 30, at 164. A plaintiff's cause of action will falter if
he fails to prove
any one of the underlying elements of negligence. See id.
See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (1985) (accepting
defendant's argument regarding "crushing liability" and holding that the defendant
power company owed no duty of care to a tenant injured in a common area of a
building for which the defendant failed to provide electricity).
a See KEETON ET AL., supranote 1, § 37, at 236 (explaining the importance of the
duty question to both parties because of the fact that any "decision by the court that,
upon any version of the facts, there is no duty, must necessarily result in judgment
for the defendant").
In certain scenarios it will not be very difficult for a plaintiff to secure evidence
of a deviation from some accepted level of reasonableness or of causal links between
conduct and harm, so a case may often turn on the judge's determination that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to protect him from some risk. See generally Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (illustrating that duty was the only element in dispute, whereas breach, causation, and damages were fairly obvious when a
faulty porcelain faucet handle cracked in the hands of the plaintiff, a social guest of
the defendant); Lombardo v. Hoag, 269 N.J. Super. 36, 634 A.2d 550 (App. Div.
1993) (reasoning that the defendant, when returning a borrowed vehicle, had no
duty to control the behavior of the person from whom he borrowed the vehicle;
holding that, despite the proof of the driver's negligence, the defendant would not
be held liable on a negligent entrustment theory); Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103 (Vt.
1989) (demonstrating an instance in which duty was the only significant issue in a
negligent entrustment action because the issues of causation and damages were not
disputed when the defendant gave her grandnephew money to buy a car despite her
stipulated knowledge of his severe incompetence as a driver).
9 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 37, at 236 (stating that the question
of duty is
"entirely a question of law, to be determined by reference to the body of statutes,
rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined
only by the court"). Retention of the issue of duty by judges likely sprang from their
perception that they were better equipped intellectually to balance the notions of
public policy, fairness, and foreseeability that are subsumed within the concept of
duty. See id. at 238 ("An uneasy distrust of the jury, and of the layman's known propensity to be charitable with other people's money and to compensate any injury
which has occurred, especially at the expense of corporations, has played no small
part in this process .. ").
For a particularly "intellectual," economic appraisal of the concept of duty from
the perspective of a judge, see judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1949), which introduced a mathematical formula
for deciding whether a duty exists. According to Judge Hand's formula, a duty will
be imposed when the burden (B) on a defendant to provide adequate precautions is
less than the product of the probability (P) of the harm occurring multiplied by the
magnitude (L) of the injury experienced: B<PL. See id. at 173; see also Barbara Ann
White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps Or a
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Consequently, the judiciary historically has been hesitant to
pronounce the existence of a duty where a plaintiff has not been
harmed by an affirmative act. 0 This reluctance has been referred to
in the common law as the nonfeasance rule." In essence, the nonfeasance rule provides that "[tihe fact that [an] actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."'2
While the nonfeasance rule has withstood, for the most part,
several centuries of societal changes, plaintiffs have made some inroads with respect to the rule.' Most notably, courts have recognized
that a special relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant could4
give rise to a duty based upon an omission by the defendant.
Hand That Hides?, 32 Amiz. L. REv. 77, 78 (1990) (demonstrating the far-reaching
effects of cost-benefit analysis in the modern landscape of the law and explaining
that such a tactic "necessarily imparts the moral and/or political values of the user
into his or her decisions").
,0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965) (providing
that
"liability for non-feasance was slow to receive any recognition in the law") (emphasis
added).
1 See id. The reasoning behind this reluctance has been explained in the following manner:
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by
"misfeasance" the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the
plaintiff, while by "nonfeasance" he has at least made his situation no
worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs.
The highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law had no
great difficulty in working out restraints upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from converting the courts into an
agency for forcing men to help one another.
KEETON ETAL., supranote 1, § 56, at 373.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). To this end, then, while it
would be morally reprehensible to allow a baby to remain on a railroad's tracks
when one could simply pick the baby up off the tracks long before a train arrived, it
would be neither illegal nor tortious conduct to sit by and watch as the child gets
run over by the train. See id. cmt. c, illus. 1.
"s See id. cmt.
c.
14 See id. Initially such relationships were limited to the classic
relationships like
carrier-passenger and innkeeper-guest. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 56, at 376.
Eventually, courts stretched the "special relationship" exception to its present incarnation, which includes landowner-invitee, shopkeeper-business visitor, jailerprisoner, school-pupil, doctor-patient, parent/guardian-child, husband-wife, attorney-client, etc. See id. at 376-77; see also Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348
(Nev. 1995) (finding a duty and evidence of a breach of that duty where a doctor
failed to make a timely diagnosis of disabling, gross fetal defects); Negri v. Stop and
Shop, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 740, 741 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that an affirmative duty to customers existed and that evidence of a breach of that duty could be inferred where
owner of supermarket failed to clean the floors of aisles for the sake of the invitee);
Fosgate v. Corona, 66 N.J. 268, 270-74, 330 A.2d 355, 356-59 (1974) (demonstrating
that a failure to diagnose constituted an implicit breach of the doctor-patient rela-
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Within the last fifty years, this nation's most progressive courts have
gone a step further: Acknowledging a societal unrest regarding the
nonfeasance rule, some jurisdictions have recognized duties where a
minimal relationship or no relationship exists between the plaintiff
and the defendant.' With the goals of deterring unreasonable betionship); O'Shea v. K. Mart Corp., 304 N.J. Super. 489, 492, 701 A.2d 475, 476
(App. Div. 1997) (demonstrating that a shopkeeper owes a business invitee an affirmative duty of reasonable care in assuring that the premises shall be a safe place
for undertaking actions that fit within the scope of the so-called "invitation").
Courts have acknowledged slight variations to the "special relationship" exception. One variation is the affirmative duty to aid someone when one's actions,
though non-negligent, have nonetheless placed someone in a dangerous position.
See, e.g., Endre v. Arnold, 300 N.J. Super. 136, 143, 146, 692 A.2d 97, 101, 102 (App.
Div. 1997) (acknowledging that "a host has a duty to come to the aid of a social guest
who the host knows or has reason to know is in serious physical peril due to an accident that occurred on the host's premises," but holding that the defendant did not
breach her duty because "[n]o reasonable fact finder could conclude that a thump
in the middle of the night constituted evidence decedent had been so injured as to
require the aid of the defendant"); Maldonado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 629
P.2d 1001, 1004 (Ariz. CL App. 1981) (holding that the defendant railroad, which
innocently injured the plaintiff, would acquire an affirmative duty of providing due
care for the plaintiff if the defendant had knowledge or sufficient reason to know
that it had innocently caused such harm). Another variation is liability for dissuading or preventing others from providing assistance to someone who is in danger. See
Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 317 (1983) (holding that defendant bartender was liable for affirmatively preventing or dissuading a third party from rendering aid to someone in danger of physical harm). Finally, there have been decisions in which defendants have been found liable for failing to act reasonably upon
voluntary assumption of a "rescue." See Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 220
(Mich. 1976) (stating that "there is a clearly recognized legal duty of every person to
avoid any affirmative acts which make a situation worse" and consequently holding
liable a defendant who undertook to "rescue" a friend but performed unreasonably
in his actions); Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, 48 N.J. Super. 457, 469-70, 138 A.2d 53,
60 (App. Div. 1958) (reinstating a survivor action by decedent's wife upon the theory
that decedent's employer acted unreasonably when he failed to satisfy his assurance
that he would procure medical attention for decedent, who exhibited signs of a
heart attack).
15 See Judith Ilene Bloom, Minimizing Bank
Liabilityfor Criminal Assaults on Customers, 105 BANKING L.J. 151, 159 (1988). The resultant success and underlying creativity of theories of defendant's liability based upon a third person's acts has been
the subject of numerous commentaries. See id. (explaining ways in which bank
managers can reduce the potential for criminal violence on bank customers as well
as the bank's liability if such violence does occur); James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses'
Damage Actions Against Non-Reporting Physicians, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 261 (1996)
(suggesting that one of the best ways to identify battered women would be to mandate reporting by physicians and to supplement such reporting laws with civil penalties against doctors who fail to report); James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law
Damages Actions Against the Unresponsive Police, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 13-14 (1991)
(discussing the different causes of action available for battered spouses against unresponsive law enforcement officers, which include common law negligence claims,
implied private civil actions, and claims based on violations of state constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and due process); Bradley Saxton, Employment References in CaliforniaAfter Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist.: A Proposalfor Leg-
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havior by "peripheral actors" and providing plaintiffs with a remedy
for every harm, some courts have embraced plaintiffs' theories of
duty to rescue liability, thereby acceding to the possibility of liability
for the tortious and/or criminal actions of a third party.1 6 While such
islation to Promote Responsible Employment Reference Practices, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB.
L.-240, 277-81 (1997) (addressing the ramifications of a California case in which a
school district was held liable in tort for the sexually abusive behavior of a teacher
on whose behalf it had provided an unqualified positive employment reference, despite knowledge of past sexual improprieties; proposing legislation that would encourage employer responsibility in the dissemination of reference information);
Kevin L. Kelley, Note, Physician Owes Duty of Care to Third Paty When His Negligence in
Failingto Warn PatientNot to Drive Contributes to Third Party's Injury, 15 ST. MARY's L.J.
493, 499 (1984) (discussing Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369-70 (Tex. App. 1983),
in which the court found a duty for a physician to warn his patient of the intoxicating effects of a drug which could impair driving; acknowledging that the duty "was
limited only to warn, not to control, the patient."); RobertJ. Leibovich, Note, Bradshaw v. Daniel: Making Tennessee PhysiciansLiable for the Actions of Ticks, 24 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 377, 388-89 (1994) (suggesting that Bradshaw is a dangerous departure
from other physician warning cases because the harm in the other cases "emanated
directly from the patient who was under a doctor's care" while in Bradshaw, the danger comes from a source that is not at all under the control of the physician - infected ticks); Lisa McCabe, Comment, Police Officers'Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They
Only Good Samaritans?, 72 CAL. L. REV. 661, 694-95 (1984) (suggesting that "the
unique role of the police in society places them in a continuous special relationship
with the public... " such that a police officer must fulfill "an affirmative duty of protection" and, thus, a duty to rescue); Timothy J. Miller, Note, The Attorney's Duty to
Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DuKE L.J. 582, 599 (1984)
(concluding that the best rule regarding disclosure of a client's intended criminal
conduct is not mandatory disclosure, but, rather, discretionary disclosure of only
those crimes in which "serious harm" will result); Christine E. Stenger, Comment,
Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before: Looking at "Duty to Warn" Under the
AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 471, 503 (1996) (addressing the opposing
viewpoints concerning third party notification of HIV status - strict confidentiality
versus exceptions to confidentiality coinciding with the conventional infectious disease standard of care).
Other particularly novel theories of duty have been discussed as well. See L.J.
Deftos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future---TheDuty of Physicians to Disclose the Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients With the Disease,32 U.S.F. L. REV.
105, 136 (1997) (noting that, while there is no mention of such a duty in any statutory scheme, several courts and "several important and prestigious medical organizations" support the idea of a physician's duty to disclose genetic infirmities to relatives
who might share that same genetic risk); Robert B. Loper, Note, 'Red Sky in the Morning, Forecasters Take Warning': The Liability of Meteorologistsfor Negligent Weather Forecasts, 66 TEx. L. REV. 683, 684-85 (1988) (addressing the potential liability of several
groups of meteorologists for forecasts that do not meet "the standards of a reasonably grudent meteorologist..__).
See infra notes 86-123 and accompanying text (discussing three New Jersey
cases in this context). See generallyJohn M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of
Strangers: Some ObservationsAbout the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to
Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867 (1991); David W. Robertson, Negligence Liabilityfor Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1992)
(surveying the state of this area of the law, particularly in Louisiana and setting up a
framework for labeling the different theories of potential liability when a tort or
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decisions are in direct derogation of the traditional nonfeasance
rule, the careful duty analysis performed therein has effected a manageable compromise between the nonfeasance rule and a general
duty of due care."
With its own unique commitment to progressive duty analysis,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey has examined various scenarios in
determining whether a duty of care should be imposed upon parties
who would otherwise avoid liability if the rigid, traditional notions of
duty were followed.' Most recently, in JS. v. R.T.H.,' 9 the Supreme
crime is committed by a third party).
In addition to the progress made against the nonfeasance rule as manifested in
common law, it should be noted that at least one state has attempted to turn the
duty to rescue into a statutory duty. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). The
statute provides in pertinent part:
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or
peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to
others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.
Id. § 519(a). See generallyJack Wenik, Note, ForcingBystander to Get Involved: Case for
Statute RequiringWitness to Report Crirme, 94 YALE L.J. 1787 (1985) (proposing a form of
duty to rescue via a crime reporting statute).
The duty to rescue has also been a subject of "commentary" in popular culture.
For example, in the last-ever episode of the popular 1990s television situation comedy Seinfeld, the title character and his friends were criminally tried, and convicted
pursuant to a type of "duty to rescue" statute. See Seinfeld (NBC television broadcast,
MaT 14, 1998).
See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing the nonfeasance
rule). In contrast, the amorphous concept of a "general duty of care" would impose
a continuing obligation on the part of all persons to act reasonably under the circumstances across all types of relationships.
iA In general, New Jersey courts, with the Supreme Court of New Jersey as
the
trailblazer, have committed to flexible notions of duty that avoid rigid formalism.
See, e.g., Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 462, 136 A.2d 887, 894 (1957)
(declaring that "duty must of necessity adjust to the changing social relations and
exigencies and man's relation to his fellows .

. . .").

The court has exercised these

flexible notions of duty in two manners. First, the court has broadened the notions
of duty by allowing plaintiffs to bring claims for non-physical harms for the breach of
some duty without having to plead the existence of some corresponding physical
harm or risk of physical harm. See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 266, 495 A.2d 107, 118 (1985) (holding that an airline,
which had to evacuate its offices because of a tank car accident at the defendant's
nearby railroad yard, could have an action against the defendant-railroad for economic damages incident to the evacuation, even though the airline alleged no corresponding physical damage); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 101, 417 A.2d 521, 528
(1980) (holding that a plaintiff mother, who witnessed her son die when trapped in
an elevator, could have an action against the elevator companies and her landlords
for emotional distress despite the fact that she had not personally experienced any
risk of physical harm). Second, the court has broadened the notions of duty by imposing a duty of care upon persons to protect or rescue someone from the tortious
and/or criminal acts of a third party. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super.
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Court of New Jersey considered the propriety of imposing a duty of
care upon someone whose spouse sexually abuses children.20 After
engaging in a complex analysis balancing several factors, the court
held that a duty to rescue may be imposed upon a person whose
spouse poses a threat of sexual abuse to young children."' Further,
the court held that the breach of such a duty constitutes a proximate
cause of the ensuing harm - the sexual molestation of the victim.2
The defendants in JS. v. R.T.H., referred to by the court as
'John" and "Mary,"" moved into a home next to the plaintiffs and
their two daughters. 4 The plaintiffs permitted their daughters to
spend a great deal of time with the defendants," particularly John,
who frequently invited the girls to his horse barn to ride-and to care
for his horses." During these visits, John sexually abused the girls. 7
466, 489-90, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (Law. Div. 1979). The McIntosh court followed the
logic of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), and
held:
[A] psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to take whatever steps are
reasonably necessary to protect an intended or potential victim of his
patient when he determines, or should determine, in the appropriate
factual setting and in accordance with the standards of his profession
established at trial, that the patient is or may present a probability of
danger to that person.
McIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 489, 403 A.2d at 511-12; see also Clohesy v. Food Circus
Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 519-20, 694 A.2d 1017, 1030 (1997) (holding that a
supermarket may have a duty to provide security for its customers such that the defendant-supermarket may be liable in tort for the murder of a customer who had
been abducted from its parking lot); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548, 476 A.2d
1219, 1224 (1984) (holding that a plaintiff injured in an auto accident by a drunk
driver could have an action against the social host who had provided alcohol to the
driver).
19 155 N.J. 330, 714 A.2d 924 (1998).
20 See id. at 334, 714 A.2d at 926.
2
See id. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935.
"2

See id.

23

See id. at 335, 714 A.2d at 926. The defendants will be referred to by these

names throughout this Note.
24 See id. The girls, upon whose behalf this litigation was brought,
were ages 12
and 15. See id. at 334, 714 A.2d at 926.
SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 336, 714 A.2d at 927. The issue of negligence in the context of sexual abuse that arises in JS. is not a wholly unique issue and, in fact, has
been addressed by several jurisdictions. See generally Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921
(Tex. 1996); Chaney v. Superior Ct., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (1995); Phillips v. Deihm,
541 N.W.2d 566 (Mich. 1995); Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206 (1980).
However, JS. appears to be unique because of the court's approach to the "special
relationship" requirement for the duty to rescue. See infra note 143.
SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 334, 714 A.2d at 926.
See id. John encouraged the girls to visit daily and, almost always, he was the
only adult in the company of the children. See id. at 336, 714 A.2d at 927. Mary
never accompanied her husband with the two girls. See id. On several occasions, she
entered the barn and, recognizing that the girls were visiting, scornfully com-
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The sexual abuse continued for more than one year until John was
arrested in November of 1992 after a phone call alerted the authorities to his abusive behavior and enabled the police to catch John in
the act with the girls behind his house. 8
The parents of the minor girls commenced both civil and criminal actions against John for his sexually abusive conduct. 9 The
original civil complaint alleged that John had performed
"intentional, reckless, and/or negligent acts of sexual assault against
each of the two girls."30 Later, in an amended complaint, the parents
added Mary as a co-defendant, claiming that she acted negligently in
that she "knew and/or should have known of her husband's proclivities/propensities" for sexually abusive behavior and that her negligence caused the girls to suffer physical and emotional injury."' Pursuant to Mary's motion,3' the trial court granted summary judgment
dismissing the claim against hers but did not dismiss the lawsuit
mented, "Oh. Your whores are here." Id. at 336, 714 A.2d at 927. Likewise, Mary
would occasionally yell to the girls as they were riding the horses, "[Y]ou bitches."
Id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 927. Despite the obvious irritation that the girls' frequent visits were causing her, Mary conceded that she never confronted her husband regarding the girls' recurrent visits. See id.
n See id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 928. Upon John's arrest in November of 1992, Mary
contended that she had no knowledge of her husband having sexual contact with
the girls. See id., 714 A.2d at 927. Alternatively, Mary stated that she was shocked to
learn of this revelation because she had believed that a platonic friendship existed
between her husband and the girls that revolved around the care of the horses. See
id.
29
See id. at 335, 714 A.2d at 926. With respect to the criminal charges, John entered a guilty plea to endangering the welfare of minors and received an 18-month
sentence in state prison. See id.
s0 Id.
s1 Id., 714 A.2d at 927. Initially, Mary and John filed a joint answer denying
the
accusations. See id. Subsequently, however, Mary amended her answer, asserting two
new defenses: (1) that she owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs and (2) even if she
did owe a duty to the plaintiffs, any alleged negligence on her behalf could not be
deemed a proximate cause of any of the plaintiffs' injuries. See id.
S3See JS., 155 NJ. at 335, 714 A.2d at 927. In her motion for summary judgment, Mary asserted that, because she had no duty of care to follow, there was no
legal basis for a court to find her negligent, and the trial judge agreed. See id. In
order to emphasize that the nonfeasance rule imparted no duty upon her to act on
behalf of the girls, Mary even conceded - for the sake of argument - that "at all
relevant times [she] knew or should have known of her husband's proclivities/propensities." Id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 928.
The plaintiffs opposed Mary's motion, arguing that such a motion was premature given that they had not had an opportunity to depose John or otherwise complete discovery. See id. at 335-36, 714 A.2d at 927.
See id. Despite the near certainty that they would prevail in securing a judgment againstJohn based on his criminal guilty plea, the plaintiffs appealed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment on Mary's liability. See id. at 336, 714 A.2d at
927. For the purposes of actual recovery, Mary was an attractive defendant since the
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against John.3 The plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment." The appellate division reversed the trial court's decision, remanded the matter, and granted the plaintiffs an extended discovery
period.'
The appellate division held that the plaintiffs could show that
Mary had a duty to warn the plaintiffs or otherwise to take steps to
prevent them from being sexually abused.37 Acknowledging the possibility of such a duty, the appellate division relied on the "continuity
and nature of the social relationship between these next-door neighbors and the girls' habitual and repeated visits of which Mary was
clearly aware. " 38 Additionally, the appellate division characterized the
trial judge's grant of summary judgment as an inflexible approach to
duty analysis, which had unnecessarily bowed to "the 'public policy of
encouraging and fostering the marital relationship.'"3 9 Specifying
some acts that Mary could have performed to discharge her duty of
care,4 the appellate division recommended that the plaintiffs be af-

plaintiffs' prospects for collecting upon any judgment against John were slim; John
had declared bankruptcy and his homeowners' insurance policy had an exclusion
for intentional acts. See id. at 336 n.2, 714 A.2d at 927 n.2. If Mary's conduct could
be proven negligent, however, then the possibility of recovery under the homeowners' insurance policy would remain. See id.
See id. The plaintiffs did, in fact, secure a judgment againstJohn with the trial
court awarding "$100,000 in compensatory damages, $25,000 in punitive damages,
and $12,439.72 in prejudgment interest" to each of the girls. Id. However, ajudgment against John was not the only relief the plaintiffs sought. See supra note 33
(explaining why the plaintiffs desired ajudgment against Mary as well).
5 See id., at 336, 714 A.2d at 927 (citing J.S. v. R.T.H., 301 N.J. Super. 150, 693
A.2d 1191 (App. Div. 1997)).
36 See id. (citingjS., 301 N.J. Super.
at 158, 693 A.2d at 1194).
37 Seej.S., 301 N.J. Super.
at 153, 693 A.2d at 1192.
38 Id. at 156, 693 A.2d at 1194. While the appellate
division focused most directly
upon the relationship of the parties in deriving its rule of law, it acknowledged the
existence of the multi-factor balancing test that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
would eventually use. See id. Predicating the existence of the duty upon the nature
of the relationships, the appellate division stated that "the girls and their parents
had a reasonable expectation that Mary would not knowingly expose them to the
risk of sexual assault by her own husband." Id.
9 Id. at 157, 693 A.2d at 1194 (quoting Rozycki by Rozycki v. Peley,
199 N.J. Super. 571, 579, 489 A.2d 1272, 1276 (Law Div. 1984)). To this end, the appellate division explained that if the court were to find that a duty existed, the duty would not
oblige the defendant preemptively to warn all of the neighbors as the trial judge had
erroneously feared. See id. Instead, the duty would entail that reasonable steps be
taken to prevent any harm that may be foreseeable under the circumstances. See id.
40 See id. at 157, 693 A.2d at 1194. The court noted that "[i]t will be ajury's
role
to determine the specific contours of her duty, and whether she deviated therefrom .... " See id. at 156, 693 A.2d at 1194.
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an opportunity to present their theories of Mary's liability to a
forded
4
'

jury.

Following the plaintiffs' appellate division victory, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey granted Mary's petition for certification.4 The
court initially stated that in determining whether to impose a duty,
the court would engage in a complicated balancing test.43 The court44
then relied heavily upon notions of foreseeability and public policy

in holding that the law may impose a duty upon the spouse of a person who poses a threat of sexual abuse to young children.
The
46
court also addressed the issue of proximate cause and noted that
judges, as a matter of law, may reject the imposition of liability when
highly extraordinary consequences exist as a result of a breach of
some relevant duty.4

7

Acknowledging this limiting principle, the

court nonetheless declared that injuries suffered by minor plaintiffs
as a result of one spouse's sexually abusive behavior were not extraordinary consequences of the other spouse's failure to discharge a
duty of care, such that a breach of that duty could also be a proximate cause of the harmi8 Applying its new rules to the facts of the
case before it, the unanimous court accordingly ruled that Mary
could be charged with a duty of care to protect the girls from her

See id. at 157, 693 A.2d at 1194.
SeeJ.S. v. R.T.H., 151 N.J. 464, 700 A.2d 876 (1997).
4s SeeJ.S v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337, 714 A.2d 924, 928 (1998).
Thoroughly applying this balancing test, the court was able to supplement the appellate division's
less-exhaustive analysis and ultimately to reach the same result. See id. at 354, 714
A.2d at 936. In so doing, the court explained that the factors that were necessary to
all duty analyses included "the nature of the underlying risk of harm, ... the opportunity and ability to exercise care to prevent the harm, the comparative interests of,
and the relationships between or among, the parties, and.., the societal interest in
theproposed solution." Id.
See id. at 351, 714 A.2d at 935.
45 See i& at 352, 714 A.2d at 935. The court very precisely framed its holding
regarding this new duty; the court held: "[W]hen a spouse has actual knowledge or
special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in sexually
abusive behavior against a particular person or persons, a spouse has a duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm." Id.
46 See id.
47 See id. (citing Captuzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 77-80, 222 A.2d 513, 518
41
42

(1966) (holding that, even if a manufacturer's negligence in producing a water softener caused the eventual rusty discoloration of water, the manufacturer should not
be liable to a plaintiff who had suffered an unusual heart attack prompted by fright
at the sight of the discolored water)).
See id. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935. ("It does not seem highly extraordinary that a
wife's failure to prevent or warn of her husband's sexual abuse or his propensity for
sexual abuse would result in the occurrence or the continuation of such abuse. The
harm from the wife's breach of duty is both direct and predictable.").
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husband's sexual abuse and that her breach of that duty could be a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.
In 1957, the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced a general
philosophy regarding duty analysis in Wytupeck v. City of Camden." In
Wytupeck, the court considered the liability of a city to a plaintifftrespasser for the city's alleged negligence regarding the condition of
city-owned land.5 ' Evaluating the entirety of the facts,52 the court determined that the plaintiffs adequately proved the existence of the
city's duty." The court stressed that foreseeability was the linchpin of
See jS., 155 N.J. at 353, 714 A.2d at 936. Based upon its rulings, the court
affirmed the appellate division's reversal of summary judgment and its remand to the
trial court. See id.
W 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957).
51 See id. at 454, 136 A.2d at 889. The underlying facts of the
case involved the
electrocution of an infant plaintiff who was playing on a portion of the city's lands
that had been used for water-pumping stations. See id. The City of Camden conceded that there was evidence that neighborhood children frequented such lands;
however, the city vehemently denied that anyone had ever been seen or known to
play in the vicinity of the fence enclosing the transformer that eventually injured the
boy. See id. at 456, 136 A.2d at 890. The boy, nine years of age, was playing near a
pump house when his paper airplane glided through the enclosure that contained a
transformer. See id. at 457, 136 A.2d at 891. In an effort to retrieve the plane, the
boy attempted to scale the fence. See id. As he placed one leg over the top of the
fence, he made contact with a single uninsulated wire which was connected to the
transformer. See id. Contact with this wire sent 4,000 volts of electricity through his
body, causing serious burns and injuries. See id.
See id. at 458-59, 136 A.2d at 892. The court particularly focused upon the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witness, Fishman. See id. Fishman, an electrical engineer, stated that the fence enclosing the transformer failed to conform to industry
standards in that it lacked barbed wire on the top and was too close to some of the
heavily charged wires that connected to the transformer. See id. In addition, the
court focused upon two other facts. See id. at 459-60, 136 A.2d at 892. First, the
court was compelled by the fact that the city's own expert conceded that all of the
sub-stations (the term for the transformer and the fence as a unit) that he designed
had an extension made of barbed wire in order to meet regulations and to deter
children from climbing the fence. See id. Second, the court highlighted the fact
that the great protection the barbed wire would provide could be obtained for less
than $75.00. See id. at 460, 136 A.2d at 892.
5
See id. at 464, 136 A.2d at 895. ("The case is well within the
established principles of responsibility for a reasonably foreseeable risk . .. ."). In so holding, the
court limited the duty as only "operative in favor of trespassers on land if the presence of the particular trespasser be discovered, or the possessor of the land be aware
of the constant trespassing upon a particular place or limited area and the act is
likely to cause death or serious bodily harm." Id. at 463, 136 A.2d at 894. This duty
is now well-established in many jurisdictions. See W. E. Shipley, Comment, Duty to
Take Affirmative Action to Avoid Injury to Trespasserin Positionof Peril Through No Fault of
Landowner, 70 A.L.R. 3d 1125 § 2 (1977) (stating that "it seems to be well established
in many jurisdictions that where the presence of a trespasser is known to a landowner, or should have been anticipated by him, the duty owed is one of reasonable
care under the circumstances" and listing the jurisdictions that support this premise).
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its duty analysis," but also remarked that any determination of duty
must satisfy public policy concerns."" In addition to providing an
analysis of duty within the specific context of landowner-trespasser,'
the Wytupeck court demonstrated that, as a general matter, the Supreme Court of New Jersey regarded duty as a fluid concept that
must be approached in a meticulous yet innovative manner."
In Portee v. Jaffee,58 the Supreme Court of New Jersey remained
true to its declaration in Wytupeck that notions of duty must be flexible rather than static." Unlike the Wytupeck court, which addressed
whether a duty of care existed, the Portee court focused on whether
the scope of a well-recognized duty of care should be expanded.6
Specifically, the Porteecourt questioned whether a defendant's duty of
See Wytupeck, 25 N.J. at 464, 136 A.2d at 895. ("Liability here rests upon the
foreseeability of harm to the child; it proceeds upon the ground that the trespass is
to be foreseen .... ').
See id. ("[T]he rule proceeds from humanitarian considerations and reasons
of social policy.").
See id. With respect to the duty that it imposed, the court stated:
[It] represents a prudent and essential accommodation of the landowner's right to use of his land and society's interest in the humane
and the protection of the life and limb of its youth .... The correlative burden on the landowner, small indeed in comparison to the
larger interests to be served, is a necessary concession to the common
welfare. Human safety is of far greaterconcern than unrestrictedfreedom in
the use of land.
Id. (emphasis added).
57 See id. at 462, 136 A.2d at 894. The
court noted:
Duty is not a rigid formalism according to the standards of a simpler
society, immune to the equally compelling needs of the present order;
duty must of necessity adjust to the changing social relations and exigencies and man's relation to his fellows; and accordingly the standard
of conduct is care commensurate with the reasonably foreseeable danger, such as would be reasonable in the light of the recognizable risk,
for negligence is essentially "a matter of risk ... that is to say of recognizable danger of injury."
Id. (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTs § 36 (2d ed. 1954).
The court also announced:
Duty is not an absolute conception; and the standard of conduct is not
an absolute. Duty arises out of a relation between the particular parties that in right reason and essential justice enjoins the protection of
the one by the other against what the law by common consent deems
an unreasonable risk ....
Id. at 461, 136 A.2d at 893.
84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980).
59 See id. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528 (approving a new cause of action
for bystanders
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and, thus, demonstrating flexibility in
dut%analysis).
See id. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526 (indicating the court's sensitivity both to violations of standards of care and the specter of excessive liability).
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care should be expanded to impose liability for the emotional distress damages that a bystander suffered upon witnessing the death of
her son in an elevator accident allegedly caused by the defendant's
negligence."' In Prtee, the court rejected traditional arguments
against the imposition of liability for mental and emotional distress
when plaintiff experienced no tangible physical harm or threat of
physical harm. 6 To this end, the court announced that it would not
shrink from the task of refining notions of liability so as "to remedy
violations of reasonable care while avoiding speculative results or punitive liability. "6
61

See id. at 90, 417 A.2d at 522. The underlying facts of Portee pertained to the

death of the plaintiff's seven-year-old son; the boy lived with his mother, the plaintiff, in an apartment building in Newark. See id. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522. On May 22,
1976, the boy became trapped between the outer door of the building's elevator and
the inside wall of the elevator shaft. See id. A neighboring child discovered the boy's
precarious position and alerted the plaintiff, who enlisted the help of several Newark
police officers. See id. The police officers, with the plaintiff watching, tried unsuccessfully for four and one-half hours to free the boy. See id. The boy suffered multiple fractures which caused massive hemorrhaging. See id. at 91, 417 A.2d at 523. He
eventually died while still trapped. See id. The boy's mother subsequently filed suit
against the defendant landlords and the defendant elevator companies for his
wrongful death and for her own emotional distress caused by witnessing his death at
the scene of the accident. See id. at 92, 417 A.2d at 523. The defendants moved for
summary judgment on the claims for emotional distress. See id. The trial court
granted summary judgment, approving defendants' theory that emotional distress
recovery is only permissible where there has been at least the potential of personal
injury. See id. The plaintiffs motion to appeal the grant of summary judgment was
granted; however, the issue was directly certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey for consideration. See id. at 90, 417 A.2d at 522 (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 82 N.J.
295, 412 A.2d 801 (1980)).
62 See id. at 96, 417 A.2d at 525. The traditional
arguments have focused upon
the speculative nature of the plaintiff's actual emotional damages as well as the possibility that liability for such damages may be imposed in a manner that is "not
commensurate with the culpability of (the] defendant's conduct." Id.
6a Id. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526. Before fashioning a decision, the court
surveyed its
own prior law regarding liability for emotional distress damages. See id. at 96, 417
A.2d at 525. This analysis began with a discussion of Fazone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559,
569, 214 A.2d 12, 17 (1965), which explains that in tort law, the rule of stare decisis
is much more limited than in contract or property law, thus permitting the court to
relax the requirement of physical impact in emotional distress cases. See Portee, 84
N.J. at 90, 417 A.2d at 522 (discussing Falzone 45 N.J. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17). The
court explained that Faizone eliminated a prior requirement that any claim for emotional distress or mental anguish must piggy-back a claim of actual physical harm.
See id. (discussing Falzone, 45 N.J. at 569, 214 A.2d at 17). The court then explained,
however, that the lower courts of NewJersey, including the'Law Division in the present case, had been interpreting Faone's rule of law in an unnecessarily narrow fashion. See id. at 94, 417 A.2d at 524. The court stated that even though these other
courts acknowledged that the physical impact requirement had been eliminated,
most of them read Falzone as still requiring at least a risk of some physical harm. See
id. In response to the confusion, the Portee court clarified that the "risk of harm" was
not imperative. See id. at 95, 417 A.2d at 524-25. The court noted that "[slince
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In its efforts to refine the unique concept of emotional distress
liability to bystanders, the Portee court focused on notions of foreseeability and public policy." As a result of its inquiry, the court explained that the emotional distress that results from witnessing the
serious injury or death of a loved one is seemingly equivalent to the
foreseeability of the injury itself because "few persons travel through
life alone." 6 Furthermore, the court stated that, after balancing the
interest in protecting emotions against the interest in avoiding encumbrances on freedom of conduct, it found emotional stability to
be more weighty.66 In light of these two major considerations, the
court held that the general duty to avoid harm to others would encompass the avoidance of mental and emotional harm regardless of
whether an individual experienced physical harm or was even at risk
of such physical harm. 67 The court added that in the pure bystander
context, proof of four specific elements6 would be necessary to enFalzone, this Court's decisions have shown no hostility to the imposition of liability
for negligently caused mental or emotional distress even without an attendant risk of
physical harm." Id. at 95, 417 A.2d at 525 (emphasis added).
See Portee, 84 N.J. at 101,417 A.2d at 528.
65
66

Id.
See id.

See id. ("We find that a defendant's duty of reasonable care to avoid physical
harm to others extends to the avoidance of this type of mental and emotional
harm.").
See id. Basically, the court's elemental test was a restructuring of the threefactor approach taken by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
912, 920 (Cal. 1968). See Portee, 84 N.J. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526. In Dillon, the California Supreme Court ultimately allowed a bystander cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for a plaintiff who witnessed the death of her infant
daughter, who was lawfully crossing the street when the defendant negligently struck
her with his motor vehicle. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. In permitting the bystander
cause of action, the court acknowledged that three major factors motivated its decision - the plaintiffs proximity to the accident scene, the plaintiffs "sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident," and the plaintiff's close relationship
with the victim. Id. at 920. The Portee court adjusted Dillon's instructive factors into
four required elements:
(1) the death or serious physical injury of another caused by defendant's negligence;
(2) a marital or intimate, familial relationship between plaintiff and
the injured person;
(3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and
(4) resulting severe emotional distress.
Portee, 84 N.J. at 101, 417 A.2d at 528.
With respect to these elements, the court found "the existence of a close relationship to be the most crucial." Id. at 98, 417 A.2d at 526. For a discussion of the
relational requirement, see Howard H. Kestin, The Bystander's Cause of Action for Emotional Injury: Reflections on the Relational Eligibility Standard, 26 SETON HALL L. REV.
512, 524 (1996). The author states:
The [Portee] court's apparent design was to recognize the uniqueness
67

19991

DUTY TO RESCUE IN SEX ABUSE CONTEXT

1595

sure that a defendant's liability would not surpass his culpability.6
Ultimately, the Portee court established that the performance of a
precise duty analysis has the potential to resolve the inherent conflict
between expansive theories of liability and the specter of groundless
and/or speculative litigation. 0
In People Express Airlines, Inc. v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.,71 decided
five years after Portee, the court followed a very similar approach to
duty analysis which resulted in further expansion of the scope of a
defendant's duty of care.2 In People Express, the court considered a
plaintiffs claim that sought to broaden the scope of a recognized
duty and to override a perceived per se rule.h Specifically, the court
of the type and depth of emotional harm experienced by one who has
witnessed the infliction of serious injury to another person in a special
relationship, as distinguished from the more common reaction of one
who has lived through the infliction of death or injury upon another
person less closely connected.
Id.
Subsequent to Portee, there was much consideration of the strict marital and/or
familial relation element. In 1994, in Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 114, 642 A.2d
372, 380 (1994), the Supreme Court of New Jersey liberalized the requirement,
permitting unmarried cohabitants to state a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. See Caroline C. Kureshi, The Extension of the Bystander Liability
Doctrinefor Emotional Distress to Unmarried Cohabitants: A Critique ofDunphy v. Gregor,
48 RUTGERs L. REV. 497, 531 (1996) (concluding that by "extending the doctrine o
bystander liability to unmarried cohabitants who possess intimate familial relationships," the New Jersey courts have "adequately addressed a novel and controversial
issue of tort law and ha[ve] set an excellent example for other states to follow").
Some commentators have urged that taking the step to include unmarried cohabitants may not even be liberal enough. See Dennis G. Bassi, Note, It's All Relative: A
Graphical Reasoning Model for Liberalizing Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Beyond the Immediate Family, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 913, 917 (1996) (proposing
that "one's emotional interests outweigh the burdens of imposing a new species of
negligence liability" regardless of whether a blood, marriage, or adoption relation is
present, and asserting that the bystander recovery rule should be expanded to focus
on the substance of the actual emotional ties between the bystander and the victim,
rather than the label that their relationship may have in our society).
See Portee, 84 N.J. at 101,417 A.2d at 528. ("[L]imitingjudicial redress to those
inflicted on intimate bonds by the death or serious injury of a loved one serves to
prevent liability from exceeding the culpability of defendant's conduct.").
70 See id. at 96-97, 417 A.2d
at 525-26.
7
100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985).
7
See id. at 266, 495 A.2d at 118 (eliminating the requirement of physical loss in
order to recover for economic loss).
See id. at 251, 495 A.2d at 109. The perceived per se rule mentioned in the
text mistakenly evolved from Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303
(1927), in which recovery for economic damages had been disallowed (when, incidentally, the plaintiffs had suffered no physical damages). See PeopleExpress, 100 N.J.
at 251, 495 A.2d at 109. In Robins, the United States Supreme Court disallowed the
claim made by time charters of a steamship against the repairer of the steamship for
economic damages that stemmed from the defendant's delay in repairing the vessel.
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addressed the issue of whether an airline should recover in tort for
purely economic damages when the defendant-railroad's negligence
in operating its tank cars forced the plaintiff-airline to evacuate its
business premises. 4 In its decision, the court rejected the routine
policy arguments set forth by the defendants 75 and, instead, cited
countervailing policy concerns that favored recovery for purely economic damages.6
After asserting general policy justifications for expanding the
scope of duty to encompass purely economic losses, the People Express
court analyzed various exceptions to the per se rule against recovery
without physical harm." The court proposed that the breadth of
See Robins, 275 U.S. at 307. The Court did not, however, deny the claim because the
plaintiffs' damages were purely economic, but, rather, because the plaintiffs had no
standing against the defendant-repairer under contract law, because they were not
in privity with the defendant, or under property law, because they had no property
interest in the ship. See id. at 308-09. Thus, as the People Express court accurately
recognized, there had never been an intention to bar recovery for pure economic
loss because Robins had not actually "created a [per se] rule absolutely disallowing
recovery in such circumstances." PeopleExpress, 100 N.J. at 251, 495 A.2d at 109.
74 See People Express, 100 N.J. at 249, 495 A.2d at 108. On
July 22, 1981, one of the
defendant's railway tank cars was accidentally punctured and began to emit ethylene
oxide, an extremely volatile substance. See id. Immediately following this accident,
the defendant Conrail activated its prepared evacuation plan. See id. The plan
called for the evacuation of all areas within a one-mile radius. See id. The relevant
evacuation area included Newark Airport's North Terminal, the location of the
plaintiff's place of business. See id. As a result, the plaintiff-airline was forced to
cease its business operations for 12 hours. See id. In response to the accident, the
plaintiff filed a lawsuit, alleging that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff
economic damages associated with canceled flights, lost reservations (because of the
inability to answer the phones to accept bookings), and fixed operating costs. See id.
at 249-50, 495 A.2d at 108.09. Conrail moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiffs claims were not recoverable in tort unless they were accompanied
by some physical harm (personal injury or property damage). See id. at 250, 495
A.2d at 109. The trial court granted the motion, but the appellate division reversed.
See id.
See id. at 252, 495 A.2d at 110. The policy arguments the court rejected
stressed that the physical harm rule is essential to prevent "fraudulent claims, mass
litigation, and limitless liability, or liability out of proportion to the defendant's
fault." Id. In evaluating these considerations in assessing the need for the per se
rule requiring physical harm, the court stated that the solution to such concerns "is
not the judicial obstruction of a fairly grounded claim for redress. Rather, it must
be a more sedulous application of traditional concepts of duty and proximate causation .... " Id. at 254, 495 A.2d at 111.
76 See id. at 254-55, 495 A.2d at 111.
First, the court reminded that one of the
main goals of the tort system is to assure all innocent victims that they will be afforded an avenue of legal redress unless there exists some powerful, contradictory
public policy. See id. Second, the court noted that an indiscriminate per se rule
subverts some of the other objectives of tort law, such as the deterrence of similar
tortious behavior, the creation of safer products and procedures, and the assignment of the risk of loss to those who can best bear them. See id.
7 See id. at 256-61, 495 A.2d at 112-14. The court first discussed a "special
rela-
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such exceptions appeared to undermine the soundness of the rule
itself.m Relying upon these exceptions, the court fashioned a new
rule that eliminated the physical injury requirement." The court
held that the law imposed a duty upon a defendant to act reasonably
to avoid the risk of causing economic damages to "particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable class with respect to whom
[the] defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer such
damages from its conduct."80 Complementing this holding, the court
issued the following general proclamation regarding duty analysis:
"[It is this court's policy to] strive to ensure that the application of
the negligence doctrine... does not unnecessarily or arbitrarily
foreclose redress based on formalisms or technicalisms."8s
Viewed in tandem, the decisions in Portee and People Express pronounced two significant notions: (1) Actions asserting non-physical
harm must go forward even though the plaintiff has failed to allege
that the defendant has caused an ascertainable physical injury,2 and
tionship" exception, in which a plaintiffs pure economic harm is deemed recoverable because the plaintiff relied to his detriment on the quality of the defendant's
work or services; the court noted that the exception has been extended to auditors,
surveyors, engineers, attorneys, etc. See id. at 256-57, 495 A.2d at 112. Next, the
court discussed a similar exception - the "particularly foreseeable plaintiff group"
exception; the court explained that jurisdictions have considered it equitable "to
impose liability on defendants who... had particular knowledge or reason to know that
others... would be economically harmed by negligent conduct." Id. at 258, 495
A.2d at 113 (emphasis added). Finally, the court discussed the "private action for
public nuisance" exception. See id. at 259-60, 495 A.2d at 113-14. This exception
found the scope of a defendant's duty to cover economic damages unaccompanied

by physical loss when "the pecuniary losses suffered by those who make direct use of
the resource are particularly foreseeable because they are so closely linked, through
the resource, to the defendant's behavior." Id. at 260, 495 A.2d at 114. For a discussion of the "special injury" rule that is required in the private action for public nuisance, see Michael C. Skotnicki, Note, Private Actions for Damages Resulting from an
EnvironmentalPublic Nuisance: Overcoming the Barrierto Standing Posed by the "Special
Injuty" Rule, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 606 (1992) (praising the growing tendency
in modern courts to replace the "special injury" requirement in private actions for
public nuisance with a more flexible foreseeability-proximate cause test).
78 See People Express, 100 N.J. at 256, 495 A.2d at 112. ("(T]he
evolution of various
exceptions to the rule of nonrecovery for purely economic losses ...suggests that
the exceptions have cast considerable doubt on the validity of the current rule and,
indeed, have laid the foundation for a rule that would allow recovery.").
See id. at 262, 495 A.2d at 115 (dispensing with the per se rule and stating that
"knowledge or special reason to know of the consequences of the tortious conduct
in terms of the persons likely to be victimized and the nature of the damages likely
to be suffered will suffice to impose a duty upon the tortfeasor...").
80 Id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116 (emphasis added).
The court stressed that the class
need be identifiable, and not merely foreseeable, so that a defendant could avoid
liability for injuries due to "fortuitous" presence. See id.
81 Id. at 255, 495 A.2d at 111.
82 See supra notes 58-70 and 71-81 and accompanying
text (discussing Portee v.
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(2) The Supreme Court of New Jersey generally disapproves of per se
rules that restrict certain causes of action and, thus, favors in-depth,
case-by-case duty analysis instead. 4 Most importantly, however, these
cases illustrate the receptiveness of New Jersey courts to notions of
liability that widen the scope of a defendant's existing duty of care."
In addition to such support for the broadening of the scope of some
duties, the New Jersey courts have continually demonstrated a collective open-mindedness toward novel theories that create duties - particularly those that seek to impose a duty upon a party to warn, prevent, or rescue another so as to thwart some specific harm that may
result from the tortious and/or criminal acts of a third party.s
In 1979, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, decided
McIntosh v. Milano,86 one of the earliest cases in which the plaintiffs
advanced a duty to rescue in connection with a third party's criminal
act. In McIntosh, the court addressed the plaintiffs allegation that
the defendant-psychiatrist had breached a duty of care to take reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff's decedent daughter once the
defendant-psychiatrist determined or should have determined that
his patient posed a serious danger to her." Because the plaintiffs
theory of liability was novel to the New Jersey courts as well as the
courts of many other states, the trial judge relied upon the seminal
case regarding therapist liability - Tarasoff v. Regents of University of

Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) and People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985)).
See People Express, 100 N.J. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116.
See supra notes 58-70 and 71-81 and accompanying text (discussing Portee and

PeopeExpress).
See supra note 18 (introducing three New Jersey cases analyzed infra notes 86123 and accompanying text).
168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (Law Div. 1979).
87 See id. at 470-71, 403 A.2d at 502. For the purposes of this Note,
a duty to rescue is any duty that calls upon the defendant: (1) to control the behavior of a third
person, (2) to warn a potential victim of the harm that a third person might cause,
or (3) to prevent the harm that a third person might cause or protect against the
harm itself. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 314-15 (1965).
See McIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 476, 403 A.2d at 505. The plaintiffs daughter
(decedent) was killed by the defendant's psychiatric patient. See id. at 470, 403 A.2d
at 502. During the course of his therapy, the patient, who was also a next-door
neighbor of the decedent, had communicated to the defendant several "fantasies"
he had concerning the decedent as well as several incidents in which he tried to
harm her with a B.B. gun. See id. at 472-73, 403 A.2d at 503. Shortly before the date
of the murder, the patient told the defendant that he was very angry toward the decedent and that he hoped that she would suffer. See id. at 473, 403 A.2d at 503. Ultimately, the patient exercised this aggression against the decedent, luring her to a
local park under the guise of his friendship in order to shoot her in the back. See id.
at 474, 403 A.2d at 504.
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California." Recognizing that foreseeability seemed to be a "given"
under its factual predicate, the Tarasoff court had grounded its decision in terms of public policy instead. 90 Despite its acknowledgment
of a public interest in the effective treatment of psychiatric disorders
via the right to confidentiality,9 ' the Tarasoff court had stated that the
public interest in safety clearly outweighed that concern.9
Following the lead of the Tarasoff court, Judge Petrella, the trial
judge in McIntosh, relied on New Jersey case law, 93 statutory duty,"
See id. at 471, 403 A.2d at 502 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)). In Tarasoff, the facts were extremely similar to those of Mdntosh, except that the murderer had affirmatively confided in his therapist his intention to kill the decedent-plaintiff, Tatiana Tarasoff. See Tarasoff,551 P.2d. at 339-40.
In Tarasoff,the Supreme Court of California ultimately held that "when a therapist
determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that
his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation
to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger." Id. at
340.
For an interesting analysis that utilizes Tarasoffas a backdrop for examining the
common law rule of nonfeasance (referred to as the "affirmative duty rule"), see
Shlomo Twerski, Note, Affirmative Duty AfterTarasoff, 11 HoFsTRAL. REv. 1013, 1014,
1041 (1983) (arguing that "it would be premature to eulogize the affirmative duty
rule" while suggesting that the areas of affirmative duty can be broadened "without
encroaching on the interests that the common law rule" had sought to protect).
See Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 347-48 (discussing the more weighty interest of public
safety as opposed to "the open and confidential character of therapeutic dialo le... ").
See id. at 347. ("Certainly a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to
reveal such threats [of violence]; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the patient's relationship with his therapist and with the persons threatened.").
9 See id. The court stated:
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the interdependence of its members. In this risk-infested society we can hardly
tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal. If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim requires the
therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can reasonably be
expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would
protect and justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in
the public interest.
Id.
93 See McIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 484, 403 A.2d at 509. Judge Petrella
recognized that "the concept of legal duties for the medical profession is not new." Id.
The trial judge explained that a physician owes a duty to warn others of contagious
diseases and to warn third parties against exposure to such diseases. See id. Additionally, the trial judge stated that a failure to perform this duty would result in liability. See id.
See id. at 485-86, 403 A.2d at 510. The court cited title 2A, section 113-8 of the
New Jersey Statutes, which criminalized threats upon someone's life. See id. (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2AAll-8, repealed by L. 1978 ch. 95, § 2C:98-2 (effective Sept. 1,
1979)). The court also cited title 2A, section 97-2 of the New Jersey Statutes, which
criminalized the withholding of knowledge of the actual commission of certain
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and public policy5 to suggest that the duty should be imposed.9 In
recognizing a duty on the part of the psychiatrist, 9' the judge exhibited the general open-mindedness with which New Jersey courts have
repeatedly responded to issues of duty, especially where overriding
public policy is concerned. " More notably, the McIntosh decision
signaled the opportunity for further upheaval of the traditional nonfeasance rule.9 9

crimes. See id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:97-2, repealed by L. 1978 ch. 95, § 2C:98-2
(effective Sept. 1, 1979)). Based upon his reading of these provisions, Judge Petrella
reasoned that the defendant had a statutory duty to report his patient's threat (even
if implied). See id.
See id. at 487, 403 A.2d at 510. The court stated: "As for public
policy, the
strongest policy which appeals to us is that fundamental theory of the common law
that for every wrong there should be a remedy." Id.
See supra notes 93-95.
97 See McIntosh, 168 N.J. Super. at 489-90, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
Specifically, the
court held that:
[A] psychiatrist or therapist may have a duty to take whatever steps are
reasonably necessary to protect an intended or potential victim of his
patient when he determines, or should determine, in the appropriate
factual setting and in accordance with the standards of his profession
established at trial, that the patient is or may present a probability of
danger to that person. The relationship giving rise to that duty may be
found either in that existing between the therapist and the patient, as
was alluded to in Tarasoff I, or in the more broadly based obligation a
practitioner may have to protect the welfare of the community, which
is analogous to the obligation a physician has to warn third persons of
infectious or contagious disease.
Id. (citation omitted).
The tort liability of psychotherapists has been the topic of many commentaries.
See, e.g., James C. Beck, The Psychotherapist'sDuty to Protect Third PartiesFrom Harm, 11
MENTAL & PHYsICAL DIsAwuIrYL. REP. 141, 147 (1987) (stressing that liability hinges
upon the verification of a reasonably identifiable victim and suggesting that
"[b]ecause an assessment of a patient's potential for violence requires professional
judgment, malpractice rather than simple negligence is the appropriate standard for
determining liability"); Sherrie A. Wolf, Note, The Scope of a Psychiatrist'sDuty to Third
Persons: The Protective Privilege Ends Where the Public Peil Begins, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 770, 789 (1984) (advising psychiatrists to take three steps to protect themselves
from liability until the emergence of some consensus regarding the proper protocol
for warning the public of a patient's violent threats: (1) to know the state law regarding the scope of one's duty to the public and to one's patients, (2) to follow the
procedures commonly practiced in one's community by fellow psychiatric professionals, and (3) to purchase substantial malpractice insurance coverage).
98 See Mdntosh, 168 N.J Super. at 487, 403 A.2d at 510-11 (noting
the nature of
New Jersey courts to "allow[ ] liberal access of litigants to the courts for redress of
grievances"). Judge Petrella evinced this liberality when he stated, "Obviously, the
courts should not dismiss a complaint on the sole ground that a question or issue is
too complex...." Id. at 487, 403 A.2d at 510 (emphasir added).
See supranotes 10-16 and accompanying text (explaining the genesis and evolution of the nonfeasance rule).
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In 1984, in Kelly v. Gwinnell,' the Supreme Court of New Jersey
again considered the propriety of implementing a duty to rescue in
the context of drunk driving.' ' In Kelly, the court examined the
plaintiffs theory that the defendants breached a duty of care to act as
reasonable social hosts when they served alcohol to a friend despite
knowledge that he was intoxicated and would thereafter be driving a
car.'02 Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for a majority of the court, emphasized that an analysis of public policy would ultimately determine
whether a court should impose a duty of care upon social hosts serving alcohol.' The chief justice noted that the efforts of the NewJersey Legislature'" indicated that its hard-line approach toward drunk
driving was "practically unanimously accepted by society."'05 Out of
deference to the state's well-recognized policy,'06 the Kelly court held
that any social host who directly serves alcohol to a guest, with knowledge that the guest is both intoxicated and will thereafter be driving
an automobile, will be jointly liable in tort for any harm that the

10 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).

See id. at 540-41, 476 A.2d at 1220.
See id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220. The plaintiff was seriously injured in a headon collision caused by Donald Gwinnell. See id. Immediately prior to this accident,
Gwinnell had consumed several drinks at the home of Joseph and Catherine Zak.
See id. Based upon the fact that Gwinnell had a blood alcohol concentration of
0.286 percent at the time of the accident, the plaintiffs expert hypothesized that
Gwinnell must have been visibly drunk at the time the Zaks served him. See id. In
light of this fact, the plaintiff not only filed a lawsuit against Gwinnell for his negligence in driving drunk, but also against the Zaks for their negligence in serving alcohol to someone who would later be driving. See id. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220.
The defendant social hosts asserted that they carried no duty under New Jersey
law to act as reasonable social hosts in the service of alcohol. See id. at 542, 476 A.2d
at 1220-21. The trial court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on
this ground. See id. at 542, 476 A.2d at 1221. The appellate division affirmed this
grant of summary judgment. See id. (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320,
463 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1983)).
103See id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. Chief Justice Wilentz stated that since
the
"usual elements of a cause of action for negligence (an unreasonable risk of harm,
foreseeability of that risk, and a foreseeable injury from that harm] are clearly present.., the only question remaining is... whether this court should impose such a
duty." Id. Accordingly, the chiefjustice stated that public policy would be determinative. See id.
104 See id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222. The chief justice
relied in particular upon
the fact that New Jersey's "long-standing criminal sanctions against drunk driving
have recently been significantly strengthened to the point where the Governor notes
that they are regarded as the toughest in the nation." Id. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222.
01

102

105 Id.

105 See Ke/y, 96 N.J. at 545, 476 A.2d at 1222. The chiefjustice remarked that the
plaintiff's plea for "the imposition of a duty is both consistent with and supportive of
a social goal - the reduction of drunken driving...." Id.
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guest causes to a third person as a result of negligent driving.'0 ' The
Kely majority also addressed the dissent's protests 1" that the Legislature, rather than the courts should resolve such matters.'09 The majority stressed that the Supreme Court of NewJersey was not required
See id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. The theory of social host liability, although
it
succeeded in NewJersey via Kelly, has experienced mixed results amongst the other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., John R Ashmead, Putting a Cork on Social Host Liability: New
York Rejects a Trend, D'Amico v. Christie, 55 BRoo. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (1989)
(supporting the decision of the D'Amico court whereas the court "[r]efus(ed] to be
swayed by the current emotional outcry against drunk driving" and it "looked to the
language of the Dram Shop Act and correctly applied case law in determining that
social host liability should not be imposed;" arguing that social host liability is not
only unfair, but also is ineffective in deterring drunk driving); Mary H. Seminara,
Note, When the Party's Over: McGuiggan v. New England Telephone and Telegraph
Co. and the Emergence of a Social Host Liability Standard in Massachusetts, 68 B.U. L.
REv. 193, 213 (1988) (suggesting a change from Massachusetts's prevailing negligence standard for social host liability to a recklessness standard so as to minimize
confusion and to allow social hosts more protection from liability than bar owners
possess).
For an interesting article discussing the extension of the theory of social host liability, see generally Spring J. Walton et al., The High Cost of Partying: Social Host Liabilityfor Fraternitiesand Colleges, 14 WHrrIRL. REv. 659 (1993).
108 See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 560-70, 476 A.2d at 1230-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
The
dissent asserted two arguments. See id. at 563-67, 476 A.2d at 1232-34. (Garibaldi,J.,
dissenting). First, and perhaps most importantly, the dissent urged that the Legislature was the preferred source for determinations that carry such significant ramifications. See id. at 563, 476 A.2d at 1232 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice voiced a general agreement with "the holdings of our sister states and with their
misgivings about the judicial imposition of the duty that the majority places on social
hosts." Id. at 562, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In
addition, the dissent referred to specific opinions from several of these other jurisdictions. See id. at 562-63, 476 A.2d at 1231-32 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (referring
to the opinions of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division), and the Supreme Court of Nebraska on the issue of judicial
imposition of social host liability).
Second, the dissent stated that the majority's decision would impose a heavy
burden upon social hosts by requiring them to monitor the alcohol consumption of
their guests. See id. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent
noted that the duty created by the majority was improper because: (1) It requires a
subjective determination of intoxication whereas the majority relied upon objective
evidence, Gwinnell's blood alcohol concentration, to show his drunkenness; (2) It
ignores the fact that guests often serve themselves because a host is too busy entertaining others; (3) It ignores the social pressures incumbent upon a social host in
telling someone that they will not be served another drink; and (4) It imposes significant financial burdens because of the inability for a social host to spread the cost
of liability. See id. at 565-67, 476 A.2d at 1233-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The majority responded to these concerns with the following question: "Should we be so
concerned about disturbing the customs of those 'who knowingly supply that which
causes the offense, so worried about their costs, so worried about their inconvenience, as if they were victims rather than the cause of the carnage?" Id. at 558, 476
A.2d at 1229.
10 See id. at 552-59, 476 A.2d 1226-29 (refuting
the dissent).
107
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to wait for a legislative solution to the problem."' In sum, the court
again demonstrated that it would not hesitate to accept new theories
of duty, even if those duties clashed with the traditional nonfeasance
rule."'
In 1997, the Supreme Court of NewJersey put another stamp of
approval on duty to rescue liability with its decision in Clohesy v. Food
Circus Supermarkets, Inc."2 Specifically, the Clohesy court addressed the
issue of whether a supermarket may be liable in tort for the abduction and murder of one of its customers if the supermarket failed to
provide security or surveillance in its parking lot."' In Clohesy, the
court announced that it would no longer require "prior similar
criminal incidents""4 on the defendant's premises to impose a duty
110 See id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227. The court stated that "[dleterminations of the
scope of duty in negligence cases has traditionally been a function of the judiciary."
Id. at 552, 476 A.2d at 1226. In addition, the court maintained that scientific proof
is not a necessary condition upon the court's imposition of a duty. See id. at 551-52,
476 A.2d at 1226. The court also reminded that it had "decided many significant
issues without prior legislative study." Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
The Kelly court did, however, openly invite the Legislature to amend its decision. See id. The court stated, "In any event, if the Legislature differs with us on issue of this kind, it has a clear remedy." Id. Post-Kely, the Legislature accepted the
court's "invitation," enacting title 2A, sections 15-5.6 to 5.8. of the New Jersey Statutes, which did not abrogate social host liability, but instead limited it by increasing
the culpability standard from "negligently" to "willfully and knowingly" and creating
a set of presumptions as to the visible intoxication of the guest. See NJ. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A.15-5.6 to 5.8 (West 1987).
,I See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of the
nonfeasance rule).
11
149 NJ. 496, 520, 694 A.2d 1017, 1030 (1997) (concluding that the defendant
owed "a legal duty of care to provide some measure of security in the parking lot" of
its place of business so as to protect against criminal acts of third parties).
n See id. at 500, 694 A.2d at 1019. On July 15, 1991, Kathleen Dalton was abducted from the parking lot of the Foodtown Supermarket on Broad Street in Red
Bank, NewJersey. See id. at 500, 694 A.2d at 1019. Dalton, 79 years old, was forced
into her car by Philip Reardon,Jr., who covered her mouth and nose with duct tape.
See id. The duct tape later caused Dalton to die of asphyxiation. See id. Plaintiff
Mary Clohesy, Dalton's executrix, instituted a wrongful death action against the supermarket for its failure to furnish adequate security or warnings in its parking lot.
See id. The defendant supermarket moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that it owed no legal duty to Dalton because its premises had not been the location
of prior similar criminal incidents. See id. at 500-01, 694 A.2d at 1019-20. The trial
court granted summary judgment on these grounds, and the appellate division affirmed. See id. at 501, 694 A.2d at 1020.
114 See id. at 508-09, 694 A.2d at 1024. The court noted that several
other jurisdictions had abandoned the prior similar criminal incidents approach. See id. at 509,
694 A.2d at 1024 (listing Pennsylvania, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, and South Dakota). Likewise, the court detailed the California Supreme Court's rejection of the
rule. See id. at 509-10, 694 A.2d at 1024-25 (citing Issacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp.,
38 Cal. 3d 112, 125-26 (1985)) (explaining that the rule was rejected because: (1) It
always denied recovery to the first victim, (2) It had inherent uncertainty as to the
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on the defendant business owner to protect its customers from harm
from third parties. 15 Instead, the court adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach 6 The court then held that a business owner
would assume a legal duty to provide security in its parking lot if, after considering all of the circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable
that customers might suffer injuries at the hands of third persons in
an unsecured lot." In fashioning this holding, the Clohesy court vindicated notions of fairness and foreseeability 8 With regard to foreseeability, the court remarked that "[t]he mere fact that a particular
kind of incident [has] not happened before is not a sound reason to
conclude that such an incident might not reasonably have been anticipated."" 9 With respect to fairness, the court pointed out that "our
tort law ...does not require the first victim to lose while subsequent
victims are permitted to submit their cases to a jury."'" Finally, in2
addition to evaluating the potential repercussions of its holding, '
the Clohesy court implied that the species of duty it had imposed the duty to rescue - had become entrenched in New Jersey tort
law.' 2 To this end, the court commented that its decision merely
"'nudge[d] the law... forward an inch or so."2

similarity required in the prior incidents, (3) It incorrectly re-defined foreseeability,
and (4) It removed many cases from the jury's determination).
15 See id. at 514, 694 A.2d at 1027. ("[We] reject the prior similar incident rule in
favor of the totality of the circumstances approach.").
116 See id. The "totality of the circumstances" approach entails the consideration
of "all prior criminal incidents occurring on the landowner's premises and adjacent
properties, whether similar or not, as well as other types of evidence such as the nature, location, condition, and the architectural design of the landowner's property."
Id. at 509, 694 A.2d at 1024.
"7 See id. at 519-20, 694 A.2d
at 1030.
118 See Clohesy, 149 N.J. at 516-17, 694 A.2d at 1028 (relying on the "totality of the
circumstances" approach).
"1 Id. at 516, 694 A.2d at 1028.
With this in mind, the court clarified that
"foreseeability can stem from prior criminal acts that are lesser in degree than the
one committed against a plaintiff." Id. at 516-17, 694 A.2d at 1028. Likewise, the
court stated that "[i]t can also arise from prior criminal acts that did not occur on
the defendant's property, but instead occurred in close proximity to the defendant's
premises." Id.
12
Id. at 516, 694 A.2d at 1028.
121 See id. at 519-20, 694 A.2d at 1030. The court acknowledged
the great impact
that its holding could have on smaller businesses situated within shopping malls. See
id. at 520, 694 A.2d at 1030. The court stated that a different result may be compelled when a small business is concerned. See id The court, however, stated that
any risk determination would be done via a case-by-case approach. See id.
See id.
1
Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 451, 625 A.2d 1110,
1122 (1993) (Clifford,J., concurring)).
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In J.S. .
T.H., 4 the Supreme Court of New Jersey explored
duty to rescue liability in a unique context - the sexual abuse of minors.'25 InJS., the Supreme Court of NewJersey held that considerations of foreseeability and public policy mandated the imposition of a
duty to rescue upon the spouse of someone who poses a threat of
sexual abuse to young children. ' 6 The JS. court also held that a
spouse's breach of this special duty to rescue might constitute a
proximate cause
of the harm suffered by minor plaintiffs due to such
7
sexual abuse."1

Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, first announced
that the court would perform a complex, four-factor analysis of the
suggested duty. 28 The court stated that its analysis would focus on
the foreseeability of the harm experienced, the relationships between
the parties, notions of fairness, and public policy in general." 9 The
court then carefully applied each factor of the analysis, in the abstract, to determine if a duty to rescue should be imposed in the case
of sexual abuse."s Paralleling its conceptual analysis of duty, the
court then addressed the issue of whether a breach of the proposed
duty to rescue could constitute a proximate cause of the physical and
emotional injuries experienced in the sexual abuse context.'
Finally, the court implemented its duty and proximate cause analyses to
the precise facts of the instant case.'5 ' The court ultimately ruled that

124

25
12

17

155 NJ. 330, 714 A.2d 924 (1998).
See id. at 334, 714 A.2d at 926.
See id. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935.

See id.

See id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 928.
See id. Specifically, the court described its analysis as one that
weighs and balances several, related factors including the nature of the
underlying risk of harm, that is, its foreseeability and severity, the opportunity and ability to exercise care to prevent the harm, the comparative interests of, and the relationships between or among, the parties, and, ultimately, based on considerations of public policy and
fairness, the societal interest in the proposed solution.
Id. (citing Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A.2d at 1116).
"30 SeejS., 155 N.J. at 340-51, 714
A.2d at 929-35.
is1 See id. at 351-52, 714 A.2d at 935.
"3 See id. at 353, 714 A.2d at 935-36; see also infra notes
170-75 and accompanying
text (discussing proximate causation).
"2

19
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the facts of the case' " could sustain a finding of negligence on the
part of Mary, the passive defendant spouse.
In performing its four-factor analysis, the court first applied the
foreseeability factor.'-4 The court prefaced its use of the foreseeability factor by noting that it "is the foundational element in the determination of whether a duty exists " 1 and by defining foreseeability as
n
the defendant's knowledge of the risk of harm.
" The court then
noted that a defendant's knowledge could be either actual or constructive.'34 Additionally, the court stated that the knowledge at issue
might even correspond to the risk of harm posed by a third person.'39
With this foundation, the court addressed the ability of a spouse
to foresee sexual abuse.'
The court noted that, although sexual
abuse is often an extremely clandestine act, several considerations
might logically suggest that it was "foreseeable to a wife that her hus4
band would sexually abuse a child." ' The court listed these factors'
without labeling any one of them as dispositive, and cited several
cases in other jurisdictions in which the factors had been used to
IM SeerS., 155 N.J. at 353, 714 A.2d at 935-36. Pursuant to the required
summary
judgment standard of review, the JS. court had accepted as true "all the evidence
and favorable legitimate inferences that support the non-moving party." Id. at 336,
714 A.2d at 927 (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523, 666
A.2d 146, 147 (1995)).
4 See id. at 353, 714 A.2d
at 936.
135 See id. at 337-38, 714
A.2d at 928.
1
Id. at 337, 714 A.2d at 928.
137 See id. at 338, 714 A.2d
at 928.
1
See id. The court explained that a "defendant may [also] be charged
with
knowledge if she is 'in a position' to 'discover the risk of [some] harm.'" Id.
(quoting Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 576-77, 675 A.2d 209,
214-15 (1996)).
3
SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 338, 714 A.2d at 928.
4
See id. at 340-43, 714 A.2d at 929-30.
141 Id. at 340, 714 A.2d
at 929.
142 See id. The court enumerated the
following factors:
whether the husband had previously committed sexual offenses against
children; the number, date, and nature of those prior offenses; the
gender of prior victims; the age of prior victims; where the prior offenses occurred; whether the prior offense was against a stranger or a
victim known to the husband; the husband's therapeutic history and
regimen; the extent to which the wife encouraged or facilitated her
husband's unsupervised contact with the current victim; the presence
of physical evidence such as pornographic materials depicting children
and the unexplained appearance of children's apparel in the marital
home; and the extent to which the victims made inappropriate sexual
comments or engaged in age-inappropriate behavior in the husband
and wife's presence.
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demonstrate foreseeability. ,13 In addition to these factors, the court
referred to empirical data that sustained the conclusion that women
can foresee the risk of sexual abuse of children by their husbands.'"
SeegenerallyPamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206 (1980); Doe v. Franklin,
930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). For example, in Pamela L., the court allowed
the plaintiffs' negligence action against the spouse of a sexual abuser because of the
particular foreseeability of harm involved. See Pamela L., 112 Cal. App. 3d at 210.
The court pointed directly to the fact that the defendant spouse had knowledge that
her husband "had molested women and children in the past and that it was reasonably foreseeable he would do so again if left alone with children on the premises." Id.
As previously stated in this Note, JS. is a unique decision in spite of the existence of what might seem to be extra-jurisdictional precedent. The decision proves
to be momentous because in JS. no "special relationship" existed between the
spouse of the abuser (Mary) and the victims (the minor children ofJ.S.). Cf Pamela
L., 112 Cal. App. 3d at 210 (suggesting that a "special relationship" had been created
when the defendant spouse invited the children to play at her home, "enticed" them
with refreshments, and "encouraged" the parents of the children that they would be
safe with the defendants); Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1067 (1998) (establishing that, even in the criminal context, the
relationship between parent and child satisfies the "special relationship" requirement and triggers a "duty to rescue"); A.R.H. v. W.H.S., 876 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994) (locating a "special relationship" in the grandparent-grandchild context). When theJS. court could not find a "special relationship" between the spouse
and the victims of the sexual abuser, it instead focused upon the relationship between the sexual abuser and his spouse - the relationship between a husband and
wife. SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 341, 714 A.2d at 930. The court ruled that this relationship
would satisfy the "special relationship" requirement, especially in light of the fact
that "the wife of a sexual abuser is in a unique position to observe firsthand telltale
signs of sexual abuse." Id.
The issue of negligence liability within the sexual abuse context has been the
subject of numerous commentaries. See, e.g., Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence:
Tort Liability for Failingto Protect Childrenfrom Abuse, 42 BuFF. L. REv. 405, 460 (1994)
(stating that the justification for imposing a duty "is based on society's overwhelming
need to identify child abuse early and to intervene to prevent it before the harm is
irreparable"); Keldon K. Scott, Negligence Actions by Abused Children Against Parents
and Caretakers,75 MICH. B.J. 654, 658 (1996) (applauding the success of the cause of
action in light of the vulnerability of children and the long-lasting effects that abuse
had on children and acknowledging that homeowners' insurance coverage can be
utilized to pay judgments of negligence); Rachel S. Zahniser, Morally and Legally: A
Parent'sDuty to Prevent the Abuse of a Child as Defined by Lane v. Commonwealth, 86 KY.
L.J. 1209, 1236 (1998) (criticizing the Lane opinion whereas it "subjects the professionals specified in the statute - doctors, teachers, social workers, and others - to
criminal complicity charges for failing to report or otherwise prevent the abuse of a
child"); Barbara A. Micheels, Comment, Is Justice Served? The Development of Tort Liability Against the Passive Parent in Incest Cases, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 809, 867 (1997)
(arguing in favor of the cause of action against passive parents because "[c]hildren
depend upon their parents for care and protection and society expects parents who
know that children are in danger to act on that information").
The other side of this issue, however, has not been ignored - there have been
commentaries regarding the liability to those falsely accused of sexual abuse; such
commentaries recognize the stigma that accompanies allegations of sexual abuse
and advocate the exercise of due care before going public with such allegations. See
generallyJoel Jay Finer, Therapists' Liability to the Falsely Accused for Inducing Illusory
13
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Based upon these considerations, the court recognized that "the
wife of a sexual abuser of children is in a unique position to observe
firsthand the telltale signs of sexual abuse" of particular children or
groups of children." The court then declared that the appropriate
standard for foreseeability in the sexual abuse context would require
a showing that a passive defendant spouse had "'particular knowledge' or 'special reason. to know' that a 'particular plaintiff' or
'identifiable class of plaintiffs' would suffer a 'particular type' of injury" - physical and emotional harm from the sexually abusive conduct of the abuser-spouse.'4 Justice Handler reasoned that this
heightened standard of "'particularized foreseeability' [in the sexual
abuse context] ... will accommodate the concerns over the inherent
difficulties in predicting such furtive behavior" and will still 4manage
7
to preserve a plaintiffs ability to assert duty to rescue liability.
Proceeding to the second factor in its analysis, the court balanced the comparative interests of the parties within the sexual abuse
scenario."4 The court first addressed the interests of the minor victims. ' 49 The court stated that the policy reasons for protecting a child
from sexual abuse are "so obvious and so powerful that [they] can
draw little argument," especially when considering the mental and
emotional scars that children usually suffer as a result of such
abuse."4 The court specifically referred to several provisions of the
state's comprehensive legislative scheme regarding child abuse in order to illustrate the consensus within society as to the significance of
the plaintiffs interests.' 5'
Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse - Current Remedies and a ProposedStatute, 11 J.L. &
HEALTH 45 (1997); HeatherJ. Rhoades, Note, Zamstein v. Marvasti: Is a Duty Owed to
Alleged Child Sexual Abusers , 30 CONN. L. REv. 1411 (1998). But see F.A. v. W.J.F., 280
N.J. Super. 570, 582, 656 A.2d 43, 49 (App. Div. 1994) (dismissing the plaintiff's
complaint and upholding the statutory immunity for defendant neighbor who had
acted reasonably in reporting suspicions of child abuse to the Division of Youth and
Family Services (DYFS)).
1
SeeJS., 155 NJ. at 341, 714 A.2d at 930 (discussing statistics that reveal that
most sexual molesters are male, most molesters are married, and most victims are
either members of the immediate family or family acquaintances).
145 Id. at 341, 714 A.2d
at 930.
1
Id. at 342, 714 A.2d at 930 (citing PeopleExpress Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 263, 495 A.2d 107, 116 (1985)). The court borrowed this standard from PeopleExpress, which is discussed supranotes 71-81 and accompanying text.
147 Id. at 342-43, 714 A.2d
at 930.
148 See id. at 343-46, 714
A.2d at 930-32.
M
See id. at 343-45, 714 A.2d at 930-31 (discussing several legislative enactments
that establish reporting requirements regarding reasonable suspicions of child abuse
and/or child sexual abuse).
JS., 155 N.J. at 343, 714 A.2d at 930.
J.
5
See id. at 343-45, 714 A.2d at 931. For example, the court cited: title 9, section
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On the other side of the scale, the court weighed the defendants' interest in marital privacy and stability.' The court acknowledged two common-law concepts that suggested that defendants'
marital interests were quite considerable - interspousal immunitys5
and marital testimonial disqualification.*" The court also noted,
however, that courts and legal commentators have grown increasingly skeptical of the rationale behind both of these concepts.Is For
the purposes of balancing the parties' interests, however, the court
temporarily disregarded contemporary criticism and acknowledged

6-8.8 of the New.Jersey Statutes, which explains the public policy underlying the reporting scheme; title 9, section 6-8.10 of the New Jersey Statutes, which creates a
statutory duty to report suspected instances of child abuse; and title 9, section 6-8.14
of the NewJersey Statutes, which makes it a disorderly persons offense not to report
such instances.
The first provision explains:
The purpose of this act is to provide for the protection of children under 18 years of age who have had serious injury inflicted upon them by
other than accidental means. It is the intent of this legislation to assure that the lives of innocent children are immediately safeguarded
from further injury and possible death and that the legal rights of such
children are fully protected.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.8 (West 1993). The second provision provides in pertinent
part: "Any person having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been subjected
to child abuse or acts of child abuse shall report the same immediately to the Division of Youth and Family Services by telephone or otherwise." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:68.10 (West 1993). The third provision states: "Any person knowingly violating the
provisions of this act including the failure to report an act of child abuse having reasonable cause to believe that an act of child abuse has been committed, is a disorderly person." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.14 (West 1993).
In addition to these specific provisions, the court pointed to "Megan's Law,"
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11, to illustrate the state's general "no holds barred"
approach to providing protection against sexual abuse. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1
to -11 (West 1995) (establishing a residence registration requirement for convicted
sexual offenders, thus vindicating protection-based interests over privacy interests).
152 SeeJ.S., 155 N.J. at 345-46, 714 A.2d at 931-32.
1
See id. at 345, 714 A.2d at 931-32. The doctrine of interspousal immunity provided that "one spouse could not sue or be sued by another." Id. (citations omitted).
1% See id., 714 A.2d at 932. The testimonial disqualification provided that "one
spouse was not permitted to testify for or against the other." Id. (citations omitted).
1
See id. With respect to the doctrine of interspousal immunity, the JS. court
opined that "'[t]he threat to domestic harmony posed by a legal action between
spouses is an imponderable; the cohesiveness of a marriage may be jeopardized as
much by barring a cause of action as by allowing iL'" Id. (quoting Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 551, 388 A.2d 951, 959 (1978)). With respect to the sensibility of
maintaining the testimonial disqualification, the court observed that "'[w]hen one
spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding - whatever the
motivation - their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair, there is probably littie in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.'" Id. (quoting
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980)).
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marital privacy as a genuine concern.'m Nonetheless, the court still
found the interest
in protecting children from sexual abuse to be
57
paramount.
Shifting to the third factor in its analysis, the court focused upon
public policy.6 In essence, the court pondered whether some compelling societal interests might be furthered by recognizing a cause of
action for the plaintiffs based upon the duty to rescue theory."" The
court recognized that the sexual abuse of a child not only caused
personal trauma for the victim, but also contributed to far-reaching
societal problems.' 60 The court revealed that "'[r]ecent research indicates that a number of psychosocial problems . . . are more common among adults molested as children than among those with no
such childhood experiences."", 6' Based upon this evidence of the
pervasive harm caused by the sexual abuse of children, the J.S. court
concluded that public policy warranted a "private right of action" to
complement the statutory protections" against child abuse that were
already in place. 6
See id. at 346, 714 A.2d at 932.
See id. ("[T]he societal interest in enhancing marital relationships cannot
outweigh the societal interest in protecting children from sexual abuse."). The
court then stated that the Legislature's extensive scheme, see supra note 151, provided evidence that the opposing interests had already been balanced. See id. ("The
child-abuse reporting statute itself has mandated that balance - it applies to every
citizen, including a spouse."). Justifying its decision, the court noted that "'[tihe
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.'" Id. (quoting Tarasoff v.
Reents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976)).
SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 346, 714 A.2d at 932.
See id. at 347, 714 A.2d at 932. The court prefaced this aspect of its analysis by
stating that notions of public policy and fairness were best "determined in the context of contemporary circumstances and considerations." Id. at 339, 714 A.2d at 928.
160 See id. at 347, 714 A.2d
at 932.
1
Id. (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 16, 662 A.2d 367, 374 (1995)). The psychosocial problems that the court noted included "'chronic depression and anxiety,
isolation and poor social adjustment, substance abuse, suicidal behavior, and involvement in physically or sexually abusive relationships as either aggressor or victim.'" Id. (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 16, 662 A.2d 367, 374 (1995)).
162 See id., 714 A.2d at 933. The court stated that, because most
sexual abuse occurs close to home, the effectiveness of the current legislative efforts "may not be
sufficient to stem the tide." Id.
163 See id. at 347-48, 714 A.2d at 933. To this end, the court expressly
stated that
.civil remedies will complement statutory protections and further the legislative efforts to enhance the protection of children." Id. With respect to these civil remedies, however, the court emphasized that a violation of any of the child abuse statutes, see supra note 151, would not constitute negligence per se. See id. at 349, 714
A.2d at 934. Instead, the violation of such statutes could only constitute evidence of
negligence. See id. The court reasoned that, because the abuse statutes "[do] not
purport to incorporate or codify any common-law standard ... [and because they
do] not expressly attempt to resolve for purposes of civil liability the comparative
156

157
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After discussing public policy, the court moved to the final
prong in its duty analysis - the ability and opportunity available for a
defendant to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harm.'" The
court rejected the defendant's general assertion that wives lack the
power to control their husbands' behavior; likewise, the court rebuffed the defendant's argument that any recognition of a duty
would require wives constantly to police their husbands' conduct.'
Having already determined that a "wife may well be the only person
with the kind of knowledge or opportunity to know that a particular
person or class of persons is being sexually abused or is likely to be
abused by her husband," '" the court concluded that the defendant's
concerns were more relevant to the scope of the duty to rescue rather
than to its existence 1' Thus, the court announced that the defendant's "fairness concerns" would not prevent the imposition of a duty
but, rather, would "be accommodated by a flexible duty of
care.... '" To this end, the court suggested some ways in which a
defendant might discharge her duty, none of which required
"controlling" one's husband or continuously "policing" him.' 6
Having determined from its four-factor analysis that a duty to
rescue could properly be assigned to the passive spouse of a sexual
abuser, the court shifted its focus to the issue of proximate causation.7 0
Initially, the court explained that it would focus upon
whether the breach of the proposed duty to rescue could, in fairness,
be connected to the ultimate harm experienced by the victims of the
sexual abuse so as to warrant liability.'7 ' To this effect, the court exinterests of the parties," it would undercut the intent of the Legislature to allow any
single violation to serve as the dispositive factor for liability. Id. See generally KEETON
ET AL., supra note 1, § 36, at 220-33 (explaining the ramifications of statutory violations within the negligence tort, including "negligence per se" and "evidence of negligence").
164 SeeJ.S., 155 N.J. at 349, 714
A.2d at 934.
165 See id. at 349-50, 714 A.2d
at 934.
166 Id. at 341-42, 714 A.2d
at 930.
167 See id.
at 350, 714 A.2d at 934.
168Id.at 349, 714 A.2d at 934.
See id. at 353, 714 A.2d at 936. The court hypothesized that
Mary could have discharged her duty by confronting her husband and
warning him, by insisting or seeing that the girls were not invited to
ride or care for the horses, by keeping a watchful eye when she knew
the girls to be visiting with her husband, by asking the girls' parents to
ensure that the children not visit when she was not present, or by warning the girls or their parents of the risk she perceived.
Id. (citingjS. v. RT.H., 301 N.J. Super. 150, 157, 693 A.2d 1191, 1194 (1997)).
170 SeeJ.S., 155 N.J. at 351-52, 714
A.2d at 935.
1
See id. at 351, 714 A.2d at 935. The court defined proximate causation as a
concept that blends notions of common sense, fairness, and public policy and "'fixes
16
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plained that, while proximate cause issues were primarily jury questions,"7 judges could refuse to impose liability where the ultimate
harm experienced by a plaintiff was a highly extraordinary7m repercussion of the defendant's breach of his duty. 7 Applying this uncomplicated maxim to the relevant sexual abuse context, the court
announced that "[i] t did not seem highly extraordinarythat a wife's failure to prevent or warn of her husband's sexual abuse or his propensity for sexual abuse would result in the occurrence or the continuation of such abuse [of children] ."'
Upon completing this straightforward proximate causation
analysis, the unanimous court handed down a precise two-part holding. First, the court held that "when a spouse has actual knowledge
or special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in sexually abusive behavior against a particular person or
persons, a spouse has a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm."'" Furthermore, the court held that "a
a point in the chain of events, some foreseeable and some unforeseeable, beyond
which the law will bar recovery.'" Id. (quoting People Express Airlines Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 264, 495 A.2d 107, 116 (1985)).
in See id.
in See id. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935.
174 See id. The court provided two examples of New
Jersey cases in which highly
extraordinary consequences had severed a defendant's liability, despite the defendant's breach of a duty of care. See id. The court cited Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co.,
48 N.J. 69, 222 A.2d 513 (1966), in which the Supreme Court of NewJersey held that
the manufacturer of a water softener had not proximately caused the plaintiff's
harm since it was highly extraordinary that someone would suffer a heart attack
when frightened by the sight of discolored water. SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 352, 714 A.2d at
935 (citing Caputzai 48 N.J. at 77-80, 222 A.2d at 517-19). The Caputzal court concluded that it would defy logic and fairness to hold the defendant liable to the plaintiff. See id. (citing CaputzaL; 48 N.J. at 79, 222 A.2d at 518). The JS. court also cited
Glaser v. Hackensack, 49 N.J. Super. 591, 141 A.2d 117 (App. Div. 1958), wherein the
appellate division held that the defendant water company had not proximately
caused the plaintiffs harm. SeeJS., 155 N.J. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935 (citing Glaser, 49
N.J. Super. at 600-01, 141 A.2d at 122-23). The Glaser court reasoned that it was
highly extraordinary that someone would fall down a flight of stairs and become injured when frightened by the presence of a water company employee checking a water meter in one's garage without notice. See id. (citing Glaser, 49 N.J. Super. at 60001, 141 A.2d at 122-23) (stating that "[t]here is a marked difference between a
physical injury resulting directly from the fright, and the mode and manner in which
theplaintifFs injury in the case at bar was occasioned").
JS., 155 N.J. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935 (emphasis added). The court then concluded that "[t]he harm from the wife's breach of duty is both direct and predictable." Id.
176 See id.
M Id. Again, the result injS. was unique because a "duty to rescue" was imposed
upon a defendant who had no special relationship with the victim(s). See supra note
143 (discussing special relationships). The decision in JS. implied that a heightened foreseeability standard, which could only be satisfied when the focus of the
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'breach of [this] duty constitutes a proximate cause of the resultant
injury, the sexual abuse of the victim.""
Finally, after setting forth these conceptual holdings regarding a
new duty to rescue, the court applied the rule to the specific facts of
the case at hand.'7 Directing attention to several crucial facts,'8 the
court ultimately resolved that "it may be determined that it was particularly foreseeable thatJohn was abusing the young girls.". Based
upon this finding, the court ruled that "evidence at trial could support a finding of negligence on Mary's part."" * As a result, the court
ruled that the trial court had entered summary judgment both erroneously and prematurely.'" Ultimately, the court ordered"8 that the
spouse's behavior was a particularperson or group of persons, obviated the need for
the relational tie that had been a linchpin for decisions in other jurisdictions. See

jS., 155 N.J. at 342, 714 A.2d at 930.

Unlike those decisions that preceded it, the decision in JS. recognized that a
duty to rescue could derive from a wife's special relationship with her husband
rather than from some relationship with her husband's victims. See id. at 341-42, 714
A.2d at 930 (stressing that "the wife of a sexual abuser is in a unique position to observe firsthand telltale signs of sexual abuse" and "[a] wife may well be the only person with the kind of knowledge or opportunity to know that a particular person or
particular class of persons is likely to be abused by her husband").
In deeming the marital relationship as the one essential to finding a duty in the
sexual abuse context, the court seemingly relied on the principles of Section 315 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as expressed by Tarasoffand its progeny, including Mcntosh and Kelly. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) (providing
that there may be an affirmative duty to control the conduct of a third person so as
to protect another person if there is "aspecial relation [that] exists between the actor and the third person ... or... a special relation [that] exists between the actor
and the other which gives the other a right to protection"); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976) (citing with approval RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315).
1
JS., 155 NJ. at 352, 714 A.2d at 935.
179 See id. at 353, 714 A.2d at 935-36.
Because the case had been decided by the
trial court at the summary judgment stage, the court disclosed that it had an obligation to "view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Id., 714 A.2d at
935 (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 NJ. 520, 523, 666 A.2d 146,
147 (1995)).
10
See id., 714 A.2d at 936. Among the most compelling were the facts that:
Mary knew that the neighbors' adolescent girls were visiting at her
home nearly every day and that they spent considerable amounts of
time there alone with her husband. Moreover, she never "confronted"
her husband about the unsupervised time he was spending with the
girls. At both the trial level and on appeal, Mary conceded for the
purposes of argument that "at all relevant times" she "knew or should
have known of her husband's proclivities/propensities."
Id. (citations omitted).
181 Id.
18
Id. (indicating via precise language that the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of production so as to warrant submission of the issue to ajury).
19 See id.
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discovery period be extended in order to permit the plaintiffs to so-'
lidify their evidence as to whether Mary "knew [or had special reason
to know] of the abuse and ' could have taken reasonable actions to
have prevented such abuse.

s8

In imposing a duty to rescue upon the spouse of a sexual abuser
in JS. v. R T.H., the Supreme Court of New Jersey reached a logical
conclusion that is consistent with the principles of the court's prior
accomplishments'" in duty analysis and, perhaps more importantly,
the general principles that underscore tort law. The J.S. court appropriately vindicated the rights of children - the class most consistently safeguarded by our society"7 - by providing both protection
194 See.S., 155 N.J. at 353, 714 A.2d at 936. The court affirmed
the appellate division's prior order to re-open and extend discovery so that the plaintiffs might have
the occasion to depose John and others whose testimony may have relevance. See id.
at 353-54, 714 A.2d at 936 (citingJ.S. v. R.T.H., 301 N.J. Super. 150, 157-58, 693 A.2d
1191, 1194 (1997)).
18 Id at 354, 714 A.2d
at 936.
1
See supra notes 50-123 and accompanying text (discussing, specifically, progressive duty analysis in several important New Jersey cases).
187 Shaping the law to afford special protection for children is a regular occur-

rence in the United States - for example, the states uniformly allow minors the protection of recission for contractual obligations they may undertake before reaching
majority.

See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981)

("Unless a statute

provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person's eighteenth birthday.")
(emphasis added); see also Mechanics Fin. Co. v. Paolino, 29 N.J. Super. 449, 455-56,
102 A.2d 784, 787 (App. Div. 1954) (explaining that, while an infant is required to
disaffirm a contract within a reasonable time after attaining majority, mere silence
by the minor after coming of age will not be equated with a ratification and holding
that the three months that the defendant waited cannot be, as a matter of law, more
than a reasonable time); Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Wis. 1980)
(recognizing an "absolute right of a minor to disaffirm a contract for the purchase of
items which are not necessities"). Cf. Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 549
(Tenn. 1992) (honoring the long-standing common law rule that contracts made by
minors are voidable, but reforming this rule such that the minor may not do so
"without allowing the vender of the goods reasonable compensation for the use of,
depreciation, and willful or negligent damage to the article purchased, while in his
hands"). For an interesting discussion advocating the expungement of this special
treatment for minors, see Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the "Infancy
Law Doctrine": From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 481, 524 (1994)
(explaining that general fairness demands an approach that would replace the
common law rule with a case-by-case analysis of "whether the minor was capable of
understanding the nature and purpose of the contract" as well as the minor's
"intelligence, experience, knowledge, and sophistication.. .).
Minors are also "protected" in the sense that, upon commission of crimes, they
are criminally tried in juvenile court and often receive less harsh penalties in the
hopes of rehabilitation. But see State v. Bessix, 309 N.J. Super. 126, 128-29, 706 A.2d
799, 801 (App. Div. 1998) (recognizing that it is within the discretion of the family
court judge to find a "waiver" of the right to be tried as a juvenile and explaining
that among opposing factors in this decision are the defendant's likelihood for rehabilitation and the gruesomeness of the crime committed). For a response to cases
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from and legal redress against those who exploit positions of trust either by acting in a sexually abusive manner or by tacitly condoning
such behavior by a spouse. The court's decision, however, did not
entirely ignore the concerns of the defendant. In fact, the precise
language of the court's holdingss assured that a spouse's potential
liability for her husband's sexually abusive conduct would not be limitless.' On the one hand, the court's decision assured that many inlike Bess/x, see generally Kimberly S. May, Shifting Away from Rehabilitation: State v.
Ladd's Equal Protection Challenge to Alaska's Automatic Waiver Law, 15 ALASKA L. REV.
367 (1998) (opposing Alaska's "automatic waiver" of the right to be tried as a juvenile upon the commission of serious crimes and suggesting ways to promote the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough
Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163 (1993)
(acknowledging some of the general drawbacks of the juvenile court system, yet encouraging that it remain in place).
Finally, and perhaps most relevant to the context in JS., this nation's highest
court has itself demonstrated the extra weight that is "balanced into" law-making
when children are sexually exploited for the making of pornographic materials. In
1982, the Court explained its motivations for harsh criminal penalties for child pornographers when it upheld a New York statute that punished those who knowingly
promoted or distributed materials that depicted the sexual performance of a child
under the age of 16. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982) (reasoning
that "[t]he most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement
may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties
on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product"). Eight years
later, the Court extended its reasoning in Ferberand, thus, expanded the blanket of
protection for children. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (reasoning
that "it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by
only attacking production and distribution .. ." such that the best way to destroy the
market for child pornography is to punish private possession of such materials as
well; accepting Ohio's compelling state interest in protecting the victims of child
pornography, such that the law prohibiting possession does not violate the First or
Fourteenth Amendments); cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding
that mere private possession of pornographic materials depicting adults is not punishable because of the protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Lisa S. Smith, Private Possession of Child Pornography: Narrowing AtHome Privacy Rights, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1011, 1045 (1992) (recognizing that the
crux of Osborne was "the uniquely vulnerable position of children in society."). For
an interesting article regarding the implications of Ferber and Osborne in the Internet
era, see generally David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-Generated Child
Pornography Can Be ConstitutionallyProhibited,4 ALB. LJ. Scd. & TECH. 311 (1994).
1
See supra note 177 and accompanying text for the precise language of the
court's holding, requiring "knowledge or special reason to know" that sexual abuse
would befall "a particular person or persons."
,89The court's holding imposed limits in two ways. First, it provided that the liability only attached to spouses, because of their "unique position to observe firsthand the telltale signs of sexual abuse ....
" JS., 155 NJ. at 341, 714 A.2d at 930.
With this limitation, the court assured that next-door neighbors will not be held liable. Second, by stating that the duty to rescue only entailed taking reasonable steps
to prevent harm directed against a particular person or persons, the court obviated
the need for an affirmative warning of all neighbors. See id.at 352, 714 A.2d at 935.
With the flexible standard of care of "reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the
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nocent victims would have a remedy for the unreasonable harm they
experienced; likewise, the decision attempted to deter the recurrence
of such harm by exacting accountability from a more expansive class
of people. On the other hand, the decision fashioned a sound protection against the unjust attachment of liability when it instilled the
heightened foreseeability requirement. In sum, the decision in J.S.
soundly balanced the opposing goals of tort law.
In addition to achieving this balance, JS. proves to be noteworthy for two other unrelated reasons. First, the case provides an example in which savvy lawyering and a unique theory of liability,
aimed at reaching the "deep pockets" of an insurance company, 10
achieved an extremely positive outcome with respect to public policy.
Second, and more importantly, with the court's recognition of yet
another duty to rescue, the decision stands as a benchmark in the judiciary's gradual eradication of the common law rule of nonfeasance.
In spite of the fact that it stands as another example of the
imagination and versatility of the court's duty analysis, the JS. decision has left several considerations in its wake - concerns that transcend the sexual abuse context. First, although the JS. court mentioned some ways in which the spouse of a sexual abuser could
discharge' 9' a duty to rescue, the determination of reasonableness is
always ultimately left to a jury. Thus, a substantial possibility looms
that a jury might disregard the reasonable actions of a spouse in an
effort to assure that a particularly sympathetic victim will be compensated. While this is a risk that routinely accompanies the submission
of issues to juries, it would seem to add insult to injury in this scenario if a defendant, undoubtedly feeling humiliated and betrayed by
the actions of his or her sexual-abuser spouse, were held liable for
acts of sexual abuse that he or she had acted reasonably to prevent.
In this vein, it is also disconcerting that, in imposing the duty to rescue, the court overlooked the distinct possibility that some of these
spouses might themselves be victims of domestic violence and sexual
abuse,'9 2 thus possessing little realistic ability or opportunity to preharm," the court sustained some measure of privacy for the defendant as well. Id.
9
See supranote 33 (discussing the plaintiffs' reasons for litigating against Mary).
:91 See supranote 169 and accompanying text (restating the court's suggestions
for
ways in which Mary could have discharged her duty).
The societal perception of such women, collectively, as "bad mothers" or
"immoral people" often obfuscates the fact that many of them are also victims of
their husbands, either by sexual or physical abuse. See Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CHi. L. Sct. ROUNDTABLE
1, 3 (1995) This fact has not, however, gone completely unrecognized. See Lynne
Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10 ST.
THoMA~s L. REv. 579, 586 (1998). Many commentators have voiced their opinions as
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vent harm. Because these concerns primarily relate to the scope of
the duty of care rather than the existence of the duty itself, a remedy
will not likely come from an affirmative rule of law. To this end, trial
judges must take special care to draft jury instructions that account
for these concerns; likewise, trial judges must not hesitate to set aside
verdicts where the weight of the evidence shows that a defendant
spouse had acted reasonably.
An additional concern regarding the decision in JS. relates to
the potential application of its holding to other factual scenarios. It
is conceivable that a detached, out-of-context emphasis upon the
foreseeability standard enunciated by the JS. court - "knowledge or
special reason to know [of harm to a] particular person or persons ' "
could produce absurd results. For example, consider the potential imposition of liability on A - B's former sexual partner - when
B, infected with HIV, infects a third person via unprotected sexual intercourse. If A had knowledge or special reason to know that B was
going to be sexually active with the third person, then A could be liable in negligence according to this standard. Similarly, if A were
"date-raped" by B, then A's knowledge of B's subsequent date or relationship with C could form the basis for A's liability to C in the event
that C, too, is date-raped. In view of such troubling theories of liability, the courts of New Jersey must scrutinize JS. beyond the plain
words of its holding and take care to recognize that the decision
blends an analysis of all of the considerations relevant to the existence of a duty, especially the overriding public policy against child
abuse.
Merricj PoUoway

to the unfairness that results when society assigns criminal or tortious liability to battered women who feel "powerless" to interfere with their husbands' behavior, including the sexual and/or physical abuse of children. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring
Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 606-46 (1988) In particular, these commentators have
focused upon the portrayal and judicial treatment of these women when they are
the mothers of the abused children. See, e.g., Dohm, supra, at 3 (acknowledging that
"[diomestic violence and child abuse, to an unknown extent, overlap and coincide... [such that] each is a strong predictor of the other."); Henderson, supra, at
586 (commenting on how unfortunate it was that someone like Hedda Nusbaum is

never "seen as a victim of Joel Steinberg's horrific violence, but as a morally blameworthy person .. ."); Jacobs, supra, at 606-46 (focusing, in general, upon the issues
that surround the criminal liability of this group of women).
193 JS., 155 N.J. at 352, 714 A.2d at
935.

